Platform · Audit Chain

Evidence nobody has to take on faith.

Every decision — allowed or refused — is hashed, Merkle-batched, and anchored on-chain. An auditor verifies the record against public commitments, without trusting Regent or the operator.

The failure it prevents

A vendor-held log proves what the vendor chose to keep. When the question is "was this record altered after the fact", trust-me is not an answer a regulator accepts. Tamper-evidence has to be structural.

Follow one event

From action to proof.

1 · The event is recorded

The action (or refusal) becomes an audit event: event_id, agent, type, payload. The payload is hashed on receipt — payload_hash is what the evidence chain carries.

2 · Events are Merkle-batched

Events group into a batch; each gets a merkle_index and proof path to the batch root. One root commits to every event beneath it — change any event and the root no longer matches.

3 · The root is anchored

The batch root is committed on Solana (devnet today); full payload blobs go to the data-availability layer. On devnet this lands within seconds of ingestion.

4 · Anyone verifies

Recompute the event's hash, walk its Merkle path to the root, check the root against the on-chain commitment. The end-to-end recipe is public: Verifying on-chain.

event_id:      action-7f3a…            # illustrative record
payload_hash:  9c41ab02…                # sha-256 of the payload
merkle_index:  3
merkle_proof:  [d802…, 44b1…, e97c…]   # path to the batch root
batch_root:    5aa1f7…                  # committed on-chain
status:        anchored

Illustrative data. "Immutable" is stated precisely here: the on-chain commitment is permanent; where payloads are stored, and for how long, is documented per plan (the optional immutable archive is an Enterprise add-on).

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