AgentID gives an agent a verifiable identity connected to a responsible party. Without it, an API key is acting — and an API key answers to no one.
A leaked key spends like the agent it impersonates. When something goes wrong, the log shows a credential — not an accountable party. Identity has to be cryptographic and bound to a human before the first action, not reconstructed after the incident.
Registration mints the agent_… identifier and DID, signs the identity payload with Regent's KMS root key, and queues the Solana anchor. Included in every plan.
The responsible party is the KYC-verified account that registered the agent — never a client-supplied value. Optional human-KYC verification through a licensed provider is a separate, pass-through step; documents stay with the provider.
One-way. A revoked AgentID stops authorizing immediately — all its mandates are suspended via the agent.revoked event.
Register an agent and read it back over REST or the Python SDK. Live on devnet.
A cryptographic identity, not an API key: requests signed via managed KMS, an AgentID anchored at issuance, checkable by any third party.
A KYC-verified person or entity who approved the agent and holds the kill switch. Incidents attribute to someone accountable — not to a credential.
An evaluation tier, signed into the agent's public passport with an expiry. Trust is a process — expired claims vanish on their own.
Verified person → approved the agent → holds the switch. Flip it, and every door closes: the registry answers revoked, verifying services refuse the signature, mandates stop authorizing — in our benchmarks, the first refusal lands in under half a second.
The agent never holds a key it could leak. Requests are signed inside a managed KMS; a stolen prompt, a dumped memory, or a compromised host yields nothing an attacker can replay.